Materialism and the Resurrection: Are the Prospects Improving? by Hasker, William
MATERIALISM AND THE RESURRECTION:
ARE THE PROSPECTS IMPROVING?
WILLIAM HASKER
Huntington University
Abstract. In 1999 Dean Zimmerman proposed a “falling elevator model” for 
a bodily resurrection consistent with materialism. Recently he has defended 
the model against objections, and a slightly diff erent version has been defended 
by Timothy O’Connor and Jonathan Jacobs. Th is article considers both sets 
of responses, and fi nds them at best partially successful; a new objection, not 
previously discussed, is also introduced. It is concluded that the prospects for 
the falling-elevator model, in either version, are not bright.
If humans are purely material beings, an aft erlife has to take the form of 
bodily resurrection. But there are notorious diffi  culties for materialistic 
doctrines of resurrection, mainly over the question of personal identity. 
Most such doctrines fail to allay the suspicion that the “resurrected” person 
may be a mere replica, rather than the identical individual who formerly 
lived and died. Th ere are various ways of elucidating this suspicion, but 
the core question concerns the lack of a certain sort of causal connection 
between the resurrected individual and the person who perished. It is 
widely accepted that for a particular material object to exist over a period 
of time each of its stages must be directly causally responsible (no doubt 
along with other conditions) for the successor stages. As my car sits in 
the garage, the positions and activities (if any) of its various parts, from 
engine and exhaust-pipe down to atoms and mole cules, are the direct 
result of the positions and activities of its parts in the immediate past. But 
this kind of connection seems to be lacking in materialist accounts of the 
resurrection. Th e most common accounts have it that God miraculously 
reassembles elementary particles (either the original particles or some 
others) in a confi guration that exactly matches the confi guration of 
a person’s body prior to her death. Th ere is here a certain sort of causal 
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connection, to be sure, but it is not direct: instead, the previously living 
body furnishes a sort of blue-print in God’s mind, according to which 
the replacement body is constructed. Th e situation is similar to that of 
the transporter device featured in the Star Trek series: in that case, the 
bodily structure is “read off ” by the sending mechanism, the information 
is transmitted to the new location, and a body is produced following the 
instructions (except in rare cases of malfunction, which may prove life-
threatening to the person thus “transmitted”). But this sort of indirect 
connection, it seems, is not suffi  cient to preserve personal identity: in the 
Star Trek series we actually have a series of diff erent, comparatively sort-
lived, individuals playing each of the roles of Kirk, Spock, and the rest 
– though mercifully, both the individ uals in the story and the average 
viewer remain blissfully unaware of this fact!
Interestingly, a philosopher who has produced one of the most 
trenchant critiques of “reassembly” theories of resurrection, has also 
devised the one version of a materialist resur rec tion that is generally 
acknowledged to be conceptually coherent. Th e philosopher in question 
is, of course, Peter van Inwagen. Here is his proposal in his own words:
It is part of the Christian faith that all men who share in the sin of Adam must 
die. What does it mean to say that I must die? Just this: that one day I shall be 
composed entirely of non-living matter; that is, I shall be a corpse. It is not 
part of the Christian faith that I must at any time be totally annihilated or 
disintegrate. . . . It is of course true that men apparently cease to exist, those 
who are cremated, for example. But it contradicts nothing in the creeds to 
suppose that this is not what really happens, and that God preserves our 
corpses contrary to all appearance. . . . Perhaps at the moment of each man’s 
death, God removes his corpse and replaces it with a simulacrum which is 
what is burned or rots. Or perhaps God is not quite so wholesale as this: 
perhaps He removes for “safekeeping” only the “core person”--the brain and 
central nervous system--or even some special part of it. Th ese are details.1
Th is, then guarantees the individual’s continued existence (albeit as 
a corpse); at the resur rection, God re-animates the corpse, heals its 
1 Peter van Inwagen, “Th e Possibility of Resurrection,” International Journal for the 
Philosophy of Religion Vol. 9 (1978), pp. 114-21; reprinted, with an Author’s Note added 
in 1990, in Paul Edwards (ed.), Immortality (New York: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 242-46; 
pp. 245-46.
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fatal injury or illness, and puts the revitalized person on the road to 
a fuller life. 
It seems quite plausible that van Inwagen has presented a scenario 
that is logically co herent. And upon refl ection, it is not surprising that 
he has succeeded where others have failed. Th e core diffi  culty for belief 
in the resurrection lies precisely in the fact that bodies disintegrate aft er 
death, oft en with their constituent matter widely scattered and even 
taken up into the bodies of other persons. But on van Inwagen’s scenario, 
this is precisely what does not happen – though admittedly, it may seem 
to our naive and uninstructed observation that it does occur.
Th is scenario however, suff ers from an important weakness of its 
own: it seems that no one believes that this is what actually happens; 
perhaps not even van Inwagen himself. Th e central point is made nicely 
by Dean Zimmerman, who tells us that he once assisted a friend who was 
an anatomy student in dissecting a corpse. He observes that 
Opening a human skull and fi nding a dead brain is sort of like opening the 
ground and fi nding a dinosaur skeleton. Of course it is in some sense possible 
that God takes our brains when we die and replaces them with stuff  that looks 
for all the world like dead brains, just as it is possible that God created the 
world 6000 years ago and put dinosaur bones in the ground to test our faith 
in a slavishly literal reading of Genesis. But neither is particularly satisfying 
as a picture of how God actually does business.2
Th e massive deception on God’s part entailed by this scenario is already, 
one would think, a suffi  cient reason to reject it. (One may also wonder 
how our attitude to the “remains” of the deceased would be altered, if we 
actually took this story to be the true one.) In a later re-publication of his 
article, van Inwagen appended an “author’s note” in which he states, “If 
I were writing a paper on this topic today, I should not make the defi nite 
statement ‘I think this is the only way such a being could accomp lish it 
[viz., resurrection].’ I am now inclined to think that there may well be 
other ways, ways that I am unable even to form an idea of because I lack 
the conceptual resources to do so.”3
2 Dean A. Zimmerman, “Th e Compatibility of Materialism and Survival: Th e ‘Falling 
Elevator’ Model,” Faith and Philosophy 16:2 (April 1999), pp.194-212; p. 196.
3 P. Edwards (ed.), Immortality, p. 246. 
86 WILLIAM HASKER
Dean Zimmerman has come to van Inwagen’s assistance by providing 
a model for resurrection that (he claims) exhibits the virtues of van 
Inwagen’s account without portraying God as, in eff ect, a body-snatcher. 
Subsequently at least two philosophers (Kevin Corcoran and Hud 
Hudson4) have embraced the proposal, while others (including David 
Hershenov, Eric Olson, and me5) have criticized it. Zimmerman has 
recently published an article in which he defends his proposal against 
objections,6 and Timothy O’Connor and Jonathan Jacobs have advocated 
a slightly altered version as a complement for their own materialist 
metaphysic of human persons.7 It is these developments that form the 
subject-matter of the present paper. We shall sketch the main outlines of 
Zimmerman’s proposal, and state and assess some of the main objections 
to it. Th en we will consider the variant of the proposal by O’Connor and 
Jacobs. Th e question to be answered is: Does the Zimmerman proposal, 
in either of its variants, off er an improved possibility for a materialist 
resurrection, over those presented earlier?
Th e question of Zimmerman’s own relationship to his proposed 
scenario is a bit per plexing. To begin with, Zimmerman himself is not 
a materialist, but rather a dualist – indeed, an emergent dualist.8 His 
4 Kevin Corcoran, “Physical Persons and Postmortem Survival without Temporal 
Gaps,” in Kevin Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of 
Human Persons (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001), pp. 201–17; and 
Hud Hudson, A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2001), Ch. 7. (Hudson combines the model with a “temporal parts” view concerning 
the persistence of objects over time, a view that Zimmerman rejects.)
5 David Hershenov, “Van Inwagen, Zimmerman, and the Materialist Conception of 
Resurrection,” Religious Studies 38 (2002), pp. 451–69; Eric Olson, “Immanent Causation 
and Life aft er Death,” in George Gasser, ed., Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do 
We Survive Our Death? (Farnham, England: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), pp. 51-66; and 
William Hasker, Th e Emergent Self (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 225-31.
6 Dean Zimmerman, “Bodily Resurrection: Th e Falling Elevator Model Revisited,” in 
George Gasser (ed.), Personal Identity and Resurrection, pp. 33-50.
7 Timothy O’Connor and Jonathan D. Jacobs, “Emergent Individuals and the Resur-
rection,” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2:2 (Autumn 2010), pp. 69-88.
8 “Falling Elevator Model Revisited,” p. 37. Zimmerman cites Hasker, Th e Emergent 
Self; he also refers the reader to articles of his own, including “Material People,” in M. 
Loux and Dean Zimmerman (eds), Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), pp. 491–526; “From Property Dualism to Substance Dual ism,” 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 85 (2010); and “Should 
a Christian Be a Mind–Body Dualist?” in M. Peterson and R. Van Arragon (eds), 
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primary aim, therefore, was to provide van Inwagen and other materialists 
with a materialist model for the resurrection that is superior to those 
previously on off er. However, Zimmerman does have a use of his own for 
the model, not indeed to preserve personal identity in the resurrection 
(continuity of soul suffi  ces to accomplish that), but rather to permit him 
to assert, as many orthodox believers have wished to assert, that the body 
which is resur rected is identical with the body that previously lived and 
died. He states, however, “I have no confi dence whatsoever that the way 
I suggest is anything close to what actually happens”9; what he is off ering 
is a “just so story” about the resurrection. And yet, as we shall see, there 
are features of his account which seem to suggest that it should not, for 
him, be usable even for the more modest purpose of securing identity 
between the resurrection body and the body that died. Readers must 
make what they can of these perplexities, unless and until Zimmerman 
himself chooses to further enlighten us. In this paper, Zimmerman’s 
scenario will be investigated as a serious metaphysical proposal.
Th e diff erence between Zimmerman’s and van Inwagen’s views can 
be briefl y summa rized: for van Inwagen, God plays the role of a body-
snatcher, whereas for Zimmerman, instead of body-snatching, we have 
body-splitting. Th e body fi ssions in a certain way, with one of the fi ssion 
products going to the grave and the other appearing in the resurrection 
world. Zimmerman’s name for his approach is the Falling Elevator Model, 
drawing on the idea that “according to the ‘physics’ of cartoons, it is 
possible to avoid death in a plummeting elevator simply by jumping out 
the split second before the elevator hits the basement fl oor.”10 Similarly, 
the body of a dying person escapes dissolution by “jumping” from the 
deathbed scene directly into the resurrection world. More details are 
needed here, of course. But before going into those details, we should 
point out one formidable diffi  culty that Zimmerman acknowledges in 
his scenario: it requires us to accept a “closest continuer” account of 
personal identity. He argues, however, that a materialism such as van 
Inwagen’s is bound to affi  rm a closest continuer view in any case, so this 
does not amount to an additional cost of the Falling Elevator Model.
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion (Malden, MA: Basil Blackwell, 2004), 
pp. 315–27.
9 “Falling Elevator Model Revisited,” p. 35.
10 “Falling Elevator Model,” p. 196.
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Zimmerman begins by agreeing with van Inwagen that “Whenever 
some matter constitutes an organism, there is a special kind of event, 
a Life, that occurs to the matter and that continues for as long as that 
organism exists.”11 In this Life-event, the “organism displays a distinctive 
sort of ‘immanent causation’, its later stages causally dependent upon 
earlier stages.”12 Th is dependence, furthermore, must be direct, not 
mediated through either a teleportation device or a blueprint in God’s 
mind. Given this,
Th e Falling Elevator Model is a way to allow the Life of a dying organism 
to go one way, while the dead matter goes another way. Th e trick is to posit 
immanent-causal connec tions that “jump” from the matter as it is dying, 
connecting the Life to some other location where the crucial organic structure 
of the organism is preserved. . . . So every portion of the matter in my body 
undergoes something like fi ssion at the time of my death. Consider just the 
atoms in my body; and pretend that my body consists entirely of atoms (and 
the parts of atoms). Th e Falling Elevator Model affi  rms that, at the moment 
of my death,13 God allows each atom to continue to immanently-cause later 
stages in the “life” or history of an atom, right where it is then located, as 
it normally would do; but that God also gives each atom the miraculous 
power to produce an exact duplicate at a certain distance in space or time 
(or both), at an unspecifi ed location I shall call “the next world.” Th e local, 
normal, immanent-causal process linking each atom to an atom within the 
corpse is suffi  cient to secure their identities; no atom ceases to exist merely 
because it exercised this miraculous “budding” power to produce new 
matter in a distant location. Still, the arrangement of atoms that appears at 
a distance is directly immanent-causally connected to my body at the time 
of my death; and there are no other arrangements of living matter produced 
by my dying body that are candidates for continuing my Life. Th e atoms do 
something that resembles fi ssioning – though what they really do is more 
like “budding,” producing exactly similar off spring in the next world – while 
the organism does not fi ssion. My body’s Life does not divide, but goes in 
one direction only, carrying my body with it to a new location.14
11 “Falling Elevator Model Revisited,” p. 35.
12 Ibid., p. 35f.
13 Th ere is some ambiguity in various statements concerning the timing of the “fi ssion” 
event. I will assume that it occurs at the moment dividing life from death, the moment 
such that at any earlier time the individual is alive, and at any later time life has ceased.
14 Ibid., pp. 36-37.
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Th is, then, gives us the “bare bones” of the Falling Elevator Model; some 
further details will emerge as we consider various objections.
Here is one question that might occur to us: granted that immanent-
causal causation is one constraint on the persistence of organisms, and 
that the Falling Elevator Model satisfi es that constraint, may there not be 
additional constraints that the model fails to satisfy? David Hershenov 
has answered this question in the affi  rmative: the additional constraint 
he specifi es is that, when new matter is added to an existing organism, 
“Th ere is an overlap of the new and the old, and this enables the new 
particles to be assimilated into the individual’s body.”15 Th is, however, 
is not possible with Zimmerman’s model: on that model, there is no 
assimilation of new particles to earlier ones, and thus “the resurrected 
body is a duplicate, constituted by brand new matter that never had 
a chance to become part of my body.”16 Zimmerman’s response to this 
challenge is both interesting and complex. He writes, 
I might be able to accept an assimilation principle that merely rules out the 
possibility of an organism’s losing all of its proper parts at the same time.. 
Suppose that, as a matter of necessity, whenever a living thing dies there 
are some proper parts that also cease to exist (for example, cells or organs 
that perish along with the organism). I am not at all sure whether this is 
true. But if it were, then, so long as the resurrection jump works for the 
organism as a whole, it ought to succeed in bringing these proper parts into 
the next world as well. And therefore, whenever a living thing survives death 
by means of the falling elevator method, some proper parts of it will also 
survive.17 
Th ese remarks seem to imply that it would be an advantage for 
Zimmerman’s model if, when a living thing dies, its organs cease to exist. 
But this does not seem to be the case: if the organs cease to exist, then 
from that time on there simply are no such organs, either in our present 
15 “Van Inwagen, Zimmerman, and the Materialist Conception of Resurrection,” 
p. 462. See Hershenov’s article for an extensive discussion of the role the assimilation 
requirement plays in our ordinary thoughts about the continuous existence of organic 
bodies. He also argues (less successfully, I think) against the requirement of immanent 
causation.
16 “Falling Elevator Model Revisited,” p. 44.
17 Ibid., pp. 44-45, emphasis added.
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world or in the resurrection world. Th e important question, however, is 
whether, at the point of fi ssion, the body “takes with it” its major organs 
(at least) into the new world; while leaving behind the matter of which 
those organs were previously composed. Upon refl ection, this seems to 
be what we should expect, given the other assumptions of the model. It 
would be strange indeed to say that the same body has been transferred to 
the resurrection world, only with a brand-new heart, brain, liver. lungs, 
and all the rest! Th e strangeness of this is brought out by the following 
bit of dialogue:
“Th at’s a fi ne new axe you have there!”
“Oh, no – it’s the same old axe I’ve been using for many years. But it 
just came back from the repair shop, where they fi tted it with a new 
handle and a new axehead.”
If body parts are not transferred along with the body, then the Falling 
Elevator Model cannot accept even the very modest assimilation 
principle stated above.
Th is move by Zimmerman serves to call attention to a feature of 
his model that might otherwise have escaped our notice. Recall his 
objection to the idea that, on van Inwagen’s approach, “God takes our 
brains when we die and replaces them with stuff  that looks for all the 
world like dead brains.” It now turns out that on Zimmerman’s own 
model (interpreted as above) God does very much the same thing! On 
that model, the mass of stuff  Zimmerman and his friend removed from 
the skull of the cadaver was not a human brain; it had never been part of 
a human body, had never been enclosed in a human skull or subserved 
human thought and emotion. Th e real brain, skull, heart, liver, and so on 
now exist only in the resur rection world. It is true enough that what is left  
behind “looks for all the world like dead brains,” but that is not by any 
means what it actually is. To be sure, God’s mode of operation is slightly 
diff erent in the two cases. On Zimmerman’s model God doesn’t “snatch” 
the body; instead, he endows it with the miraculous power to trans port 
itself to the resurrection world. And he doesn’t himself craft  the “brain 
surrogate” that is left  behind; rather, he creates a situation in which the 
real brain does that itself, by leaving behind its elementary particles, etc., 
in the right relative positions as it departs for a better place. Nevertheless, 
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the similarities are striking. If the deceptiveness of the whole process is 
a reason to reject van Inwagen’s scenario, is Zimmerman’s really all that 
much better off ?
But we need to return to Zimmerman’s defense of his view. What 
is needed, he tells us, is a more precise formulation of the assimilation 
principle. Aft er one less-than-successful eff ort, he proposes 
(AP2) If x persists through some fi nite period leading up to, but 
not including, t, then if x exists at t, every set S into which x is 
decomposable without remainder at t has members with parts that 
were parts of x before t.18
Th is principle, Zimmerman thinks, is what Hershenov needs, and if it 
is true then the body in the resur rection world, on the Falling Elevator 
Model, cannot be identical with the body that previ ous ly existed in our 
world. For the body in the resurrection world is presumably decomposable 
into a set of elementary particles, and we have been told that none of 
those particles existed here in our everyday world. But, Zimmerman 
claims, (AP2) is not obviously true. In quantum mechanics, individual 
particles (for instance, those in one’s body) are not “trackable” over time. 
He asks:
Why do nature’s laws fail to distinguish between circumstance A, in which 
this proton shows up there and that proton shows up here, and circumstance 
B, in which that proton shows up there and this proton shows up here? Some 
say: the best explanation is that the imagined diff erence between A and B 
does not exist – these are not two distinct states of the system. If the two 
protons really persisted over time, A and B would be distinct states; and so 
the protons do not really persist.19
If this is so, then (AP2), which apparently does require the persistence 
of particles, is false, and the Falling Elevator Model has nothing to fear. 
Zimmerman acknowledges that there are alternative explanations that do 
allow particles to persist. He asks, however, “why gamble on an assimilation 
principle that requires the falsehood of an attractive explanation of this 
18 Ibid., p. 46.
19 Ibid., pp. 46-47.
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strange feature of quantum statistics?”20 Due metaphysical caution, then, 
should lead us to withhold assent from such a principle as (AP2).
Th e maneuver is ingenious, but I do not believe it succeeds. So far as 
I know, neither Zimmerman nor anyone else has claimed that quantum 
mechanics has refuted the relativistic equivalence of mass and energy, 
enshrined in the famous equation e = mc2. I suggest, then, that instead 
of particles as the fundamental “parts” of matter we think instead of 
parcels of mass-energy. Such “parcels” have the advantage over particles 
that they can undergo more changes of state while retaining their identity. 
(Compare: ice cubes vs. H2O.) Parcels of mass-energy can exist in the 
form of discrete particles, but they can transform into diff erent kinds of 
particles (as happens in high-energy physics experiments), or into radiant 
energy (as in the thermonuclear reactions in our sun), or combine with 
other such parcels, and so on. Th e fl exibility built into the notion of parcels 
of mass-energy means that (AP2) can very well be true, even in the face 
of the failure of individual particles to persist, provided that the “parts” 
mentioned in the principle are understood as parcels of mass-energy. To 
make this absolutely clear, we may restate the principle as follows:
(AP2’) If x persists through some fi nite period leading up to, but 
not including, t, then if x exists at t, every set S into which x is 
decomposable without remainder at t has members with parts – viz., 
parcels of mass-energy – that were parts of x before t.
(AP2’), I claim, formulates our belief that assimilation is required in 
a way that is not undermined by the quantum phenomena adduced by 
Zimmerman. And it does rule out the Falling Elevator Model; on that 
model, all of the mass-energy of the original body remains behind in our 
everyday world.
Th e other main objection to be considered here is one put forward 
by me concerning the Falling Elevator Model’s endorsement of a closest 
continuer theory of personal identity.21 What is problematic about the 
20 Ibid., p. 47.
21 Th e objection presented by Eric Olson will not be considered here. Th e objection is 
extremely interesting, but the argument becomes quite complicated and I am inclined to 
think the result must be inconclusive. For discussion, see Zimmerman’s “Falling Elevator 
Model Revisited,” pp. 48-50.
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theory is its violation of what has come to be called the “only x and y 
principle” (OXY), stated roughly by Zimmerman as “the thesis that facts 
outside the spatio temporal path swept out by an object could not have 
made any diff erence to the question of whether a single object swept 
along that path.”22
It is clear that the model does require a closest continuer theory which 
violates (OXY). Consider a situation in which, as a person approaches 
death, the body’s particles undergo “budding,” as the model prescribes, 
and as a result a body comes to exist in the future, resur rection world. 
Now, if the body in our world were to survive, that body would continue 
to be the body of that person, and in fact to be the person,23 since it would 
be the “closest continuer” of that person’s life. If on the other hand that 
body does not survive (as the model prescribes), the closest continuer is 
the body in the resurrection world.
Now, Zimmerman recognizes that the endorsement of a closest 
continuer view might strike us as a disadvantage of his model.24 He 
argues, as has been noted, that any materialist view of human beings can 
be forced to adopt a closest continuer theory, so this does not constitute 
an additional cost for the Falling Elevator Model over and above what 
a materialist is already committed to. I claimed, on the contrary, that 
a materialist need not, and should not, embrace a closest continuer 
theory. Here in brief is the case for Zimmerman’s claim: consider an 
organism that can be divided (more or less) symmetrically into two 
parts, each of which, if it alone survives, is suffi  cient to constitute the 
survival of the organism. (Th is may not be true of human beings; if it is 
22 “Falling Elevator Model,” p. 198. In “Falling Elevator Model Revisited,” Zimmerman 
devotes some eff ort towards a more precise formulation of the principle, but this material 
is not essential for the present discussion.
23 Or perhaps, to constitute the person. Th e points discussed here are independent 
of the diff erence between the identity of person and body, affi  rmed by van Inwagen and 
by O’Connor and Jacobs, and a constitution view such as that held by Corcoran or Lynn 
Rudder Baker.
24 In 1999 he wrote, “Some will insist that adopting a closest continuer theory of 
personal identity is just as wildly implausible as supposing that God is a body-snatcher – 
and, for the record, I am inclined to agree” (“Falling Elevator Model,” p. 196f.). Given this, 
it is a bit diffi  cult to see how Zimmerman can make any positive use of his model, even 
for the purpose of securing the identity of the resurrection body with the body which 
died. It may be that Zimmer man’s views on closest continuer theories have soft ened in 
the intervening decade.
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not, imagine whatever modifi cation of human anatomy is required in 
order to make it possible.) If one part of the divided organism survives, 
then so does the organism. But if both survive, then they cannot both 
be identical with the original organism, and the apparent conclu sion is 
that the organism’s life has ended, with two successor organisms left  in 
its place. Unless, to be sure, one of the successors has for some reason 
a better claim than the other to be identical with the original – thus, the 
“closest continuer.” In the Falling Elevator Model, the closest continuer 
is the body in the resurrection world, because that body alone continues 
the Life of the person. But any materialist view, Zimmerman contends, 
can be forced to adopt a closest continuer theory, given that it is possible 
for person-constituting organisms to be symmetrically divided. Here is 
Zimmerman’s summary of my answer to this argument:
Hasker’s discussion involves Mark, a human–like creature whose cerebrum, 
brain stem, and so on are neatly divisible. Hasker thinks he has found a way 
for van Inwagen to maintain that: (a) Mark could survive the destruction 
of half of his matter, (b) fi ssion along the same plane would result in Mark’s 
death, and (c) (OXY) is true. In the case in which half of Mark’s cells are 
destroyed, Hasker claims that it is not “consistent with the actual history” of 
Mark that an “equal claimant” should have existed. Th e destruction of half 
of Mark’s cells—the ones which, had they been carefully removed, would 
have constituted an equal claimant—is “an event in Mark’s own life,” says 
Hasker.25
Zimmerman, however, is not convinced. He replies:
If this is to represent a way to save (OXY), the claim must be that the events 
undergone by the series of hunks of matter constituting Mark, in the world 
that includes destruction of half of his matter, cannot be paired up with 
intrinsically similar events undergone by a similar series of hunks of matter 
in a world where Mark undergoes fi ssion. But I do not see why this must be 
so. Compare two surgeries: in one, an organ is cut away from a living body 
and simultaneously destroyed; in another, the organ is cut away in the same 
fashion but preserved for transplantation into another body. Th ere need 
be no diff erence between the two surgeries, from the point of view of the 
25 “Falling Elevator Model Revisited,” pp. 41-42; the quotation is from Th e Emergent 
Self, p. 230.
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hunks of matter constituting the patient’s body before, during, and aft er the 
surgery; intrinsically, the events within the body of the patient will “look” 
exactly the same. Similarly, when considering just the region occupied by 
Mark’s body, and the events that go on within it when half of its matter is cut 
away and simultaneously killed, I cannot see why a region just like that could 
not contain exactly similar matter undergoing exactly similar events, when 
the departing organs are cut away and preserved alive.26
Zimmerman, however, has failed to grasp the scenario I was proposing. 
When I said that half of Mark’s cells are destroyed, it was implied that 
they are destroyed while they are still part of Mark’s body. (I may not have 
been suffi  ciently explicit. However, my reference to “laser surgery” might 
have suggested the correct interpretation to Zimmerman. Th ere are in 
fact surgeries where diseased or undesired tissue is destroyed without 
fi rst being removed from the body.) And since the destruction of tissue 
occurs while the cells are part of Mark’s body, there is not and cannot be, 
consistent with this actual history, another “claimant” to Mark’s identity. 
If on the other hand Mark is surgically divided, and subsequently one 
set of cells is allowed to perish, I would indeed say that Mark has not 
survived the surgery. We may, to be sure, be thankful that, so far as we 
know, such procedures are not in the offi  ng for human persons!
In view of this, I stick to my original claim: a materialist such as van 
Inwagen need not, and since he need not he should not, accept a closest 
continuer theory of personal identity. I went on to argue that a closest 
continuer theory is unacceptable because it leads to making identity 
a contingent relation – but identity that is merely contingent is not identity. 
Now, Zimmerman agrees that a theory that makes identity contingent is 
unacceptable. He points out, however, that a closest continuer theorist 
has an alternative to contingent identity, one that is not so clearly 
unacceptable. (I had alluded to this possibility in a footnote, but did not 
spell it out or discuss it.) In order to get a grasp on this, consider the 
situation in which, at the moment of death, an organism has “fi ssioned” 
in the way specifi ed by the Falling Elevator Model. Th ere is the original, 
living person, whom we may call Alphonse. Th ere is the body which 
is left  behind in our everyday world, which we call Boris. And there is 
the body in the resurrection world, which we shall dub Carlos. (Th e 
26 Ibid., p. 42.
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introduction of these names is meant to leave it an open question as to 
what identity relations may obtain between Alphonse, Boris, and Carlos.) 
Suppose, furthermore, that aft er the fi ssion (but contrary to the model) 
Boris and Carlos both continue to live. Aft er this has occurred, we might 
imagine Carlos saying, “If Boris had not survived I would have been 
identical with Alphonse, but since he did survive it is he who is identical 
with Alphonse and I am not.” Th is scenario makes Carlos’s identity with 
Alphonse contingent, and both Zimmer man and I rule it out. But we can 
also imagine Carlos saying, “Since Boris survived, I exist as an indi vidual 
distinct from Alphonse, but had he not survived I would not exist.” Th is 
may strike us as strange, but unlike Carlos’s other response it does not 
make identity contingent, and Zimmerman argues that it does not give 
us good reason to reject the closest continuer theory. Readers will have 
to consider whe ther this does make his model more acceptable; later on 
I shall present an argument against Zimmerman’s use of this idea.
It is time to assess the Falling Elevator Model in the light of this 
discussion. If (AP2’) or some other appropriate version of the assimilation 
requirement holds, Boris is identical with the body of Alphonse and 
Alphonse does not survive. Even apart from the assimilation requirement, 
if the “only x and y” principle holds and closest continuer theories are 
rejected, the model again fails. According to the model, both Boris and 
Carlos are candidates for continuing the life of Alphonse – but if so, then 
it follows from (OXY) that neither is identical with Alphonse; his life 
comes to an end at the point of fi ssion. So for the model to have a chance 
of success, we must reject both the assimilation requirement and the 
“only x and y” principle – already a considerable metaphysical cost.
But suppose that neither of these principles states a necessary 
condition for personal identity over time. Even so, a case can be made 
that it is Boris, rather than Carlos, which is the best candidate for identity 
with the body of Alphonse. Even if continuity of matter, and the gradual 
assimilation of new matter, are not a logically necessary condition for 
bodily identity over time, it would seem strange to deny that they have 
weight – indeed considerable weight – in determining which of two 
otherwise equal competitors is “closest” to the original body. So it would 
seem that Boris has a substantial advantage over Carlos in this respect, 
and we should conclude that Boris, rather than Carlos, is identical with 
the body of Alphonse. Once again, Alphonse does not survive.
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Th e claim made by the model, however, is that the determining factor 
is that Carlos, rather than Boris, continues the Life of Alphonse, and in 
view of this it is Carlos who is identical with Alphonse. At last, then, we 
have Alphonse alive and ready for his eternal destiny! Th ere is, however, 
a further objection to this scenario. Zimmerman has indicated his 
support for a “temporal ly closest continuer” account of identity over time, 
where a claimant occurring earlier is deemed “closer” than an otherwise 
equal claimant occurring at a later time.27 He gives no argument for this 
view, being content to rely on considerations of general plausibility. Here 
I propose an argument in support of such a preference – one supporting 
a conclusion that is stronger than Zimmerman’s. Consider, fi rst of all, the 
variant of the model in which the resurrection is not immediate, but occurs 
in the future (perhaps the far distant future). Consider, also, the fact that 
Boris’s identity or non-identity with the body of Alphonse is an essential 
attribute of Boris, one that Boris must possess, in a determinate form, 
at every moment of its existence. As we have learned to say in another 
context, this is a “hard fact” about Boris at t, the moment at which Boris 
begins to exist. Carlos, however, does not exist at t; at t, there is no such thing 
as Carlos. (I am assuming a “presentist” view in the philosophy of time, 
a view that Zimmerman endorses.) Furthermore, there is no determinate 
fact at t concerning the future existence or non-existence of Carlos. If it is 
true that Carlos will exist at a later time t*, this is a “soft  fact” rather than 
a “hard fact” at t.28 Th is is so, in spite of the immanent-causal relationship 
that, according to the model, holds between Alphonse and Carlos. Th e 
body of Alphonse may have made its immanent-causal contribution to 
the existence of Carlos, but it is logically possible that something should 
occur just prior to the time at which Carlos is to make his appearance 
that would prevent him from existing, or from existing in the right way 
to continue the life of Alphonse. (Perhaps a nuclear explosion, detonated 
just at the spot where Carlos would make his appearance.) But here is 
the point: Something that is a hard fact at t logically cannot depend on 
something that is (at most) a soft  fact at t. It is possible that something 
should prevent Carlos’s appearance at t*, but if Boris is identical at t with 
the body of Alphonse, it is not possible that anything should occur at 
27 “Falling Elevator Model,” p. 206.
28 Whether there are truths concerning future contingent events is a disputed question 
among presentists; the argument here does not require an answer to that question.
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some later time that would prevent this identity from holding. What this 
means is, that the appearance of Carlos at t* is irrelevant to the identity of 
Boris with the body of Alphonse; it cannot therefore prevent this identity 
from holding. We must conclude, then, that Carlos is not in competition 
with Boris as a continuer for the body of Alphonse; Boris is the only 
candidate, and so Boris is identical with Alphonse’s body, and once again 
Alphonse does not survive.
Further refl ection reveals that this conclusion holds even if the 
“resurrection” is immediate. Now we are supposing that t, the moment of 
fi ssion which marks the beginning of Boris’s existence, is also the moment 
which marks the beginning of Carlos’s existence. Since fi ssion occurred at 
the moment which marks the end of Alphonse’s natural life – the moment 
such that, at any subsequent moment, he would no longer be alive – we 
must conclude that at t neither Boris nor Carlos is alive, though they 
are still in a condition such that their life-functions could be restored.29 
Now, according to the model, God does restore Carlos’s life-functions 
soon aft er t, and it is in virtue of this that Carlos is the closest continuer 
of Alphonse, and is identical with Alphonse. But the considerations of 
the preceding paragraph show that this is a mistake. It is already the 
case beginning at t that both Boris and Carlos determinately exist; their 
existence is a hard fact. But the restoration of life-functions in the case 
of Carlos is not a hard fact at t; that restoration is a contingent event 
which still lies in the future, albeit the very near future. So for the same 
reasons given above, that restoration cannot play a role in determining 
the identity relations between Alphonse, Boris, and Carlos. What does 
play that role is the continuity-of-matter criterion, and that criterion 
decisively favors Boris over Carlos as the closest continuer of Alphonse. 
We are still forced to conclude that Alphonse does not survive!
I think it is fair to say at this point that the prospects for the Falling 
Elevator Model, as presented by Zimmerman, are not very bright. 
In order for the model to work, all of the metaphysical diffi  culties set 
forth above need to be overcome. Th e result, however, will be a model 
29 In some of his statements Zimmerman seems to suggest that Carlos is not dead – 
that his life continues, though of course the corpse, Boris, is dead. Th e view that biological 
death never actually happens to human beings may well be theologically problematic; 
certainly it would not be acceptable to van Inwagen. (“It is part of the Christian faith that 
all men who share in the sin of Adam must die.”)
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that shares with van Inwagen’s model (which it is supposed to replace) 
the most serious objection to that model, namely that it involves an 
unacceptable policy of deception on God’s part. Th e only clear advantage, 
in comparison with van Inwagen, is that the “pseudo-body” that is left  
behind for the mourners to bury is made of the same “stuff ” – elementary 
particles, parcels of mass-energy, or whatever – that once composed the 
body of the deceased. Th is does not seem much of an advantage, given 
the costs involved – nor does it seem that the prospects for a materialist 
resurrection are greatly improved by the change.
It remains to consider the variant of the Falling Elevator Model 
proposed by Timothy O’Connor and Jonathan Jacobs. For the most 
part, they accept the model as presented by Zimmerman, but there are 
two signifi cant points of diff erence. Zimmerman proposed that, at the 
moment of death, God miraculously confers on the body’s particles 
(or other constituents) the power to immanent-cause particles in the 
resurrection world. O’Connor and Jacobs say, “We’re not so sanguine 
about the miraculous-addition-of-causal-powers bit, suspecting that it 
can be bought only by one soft  on causation”30 Th e thought here is that 
the fundamental causal powers of any entity are intrinsic and essential 
to that entity, and cannot be added to without undermining the entity’s 
identity. Th ey continue, however,
But no mind: we need only suppose that the features of the constituents of 
Augustine’s body – and as these are no diff erent in kind from the constituents 
of any material thing, of all material things – and the emergent-level aspects 
of Augustine jointly have a hitherto entirely latent tendency to jointly 
cause the composing simples to fi ssion in the requisite context, which is 
providentially connected solely to situations of imminent demise. (Perhaps 
God miraculously brings to bear some requisite additional force-like factor 
that acts as a co-cause with the relevant disposition).31
Th is move greatly expands the scope of the “power to fi ssion”: instead 
of being conferred on a relatively few particles (those that constitute the 
bodies of persons at the time of their death), this power is an inherent 
attribute of all the matter in the universe. But God’s special intervention 
30 “Emergent Individuals and the Resurrection,” p. 79.
31 Ibid., p. 79.
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will, one assumes, still be required, both in “triggering” the actual 
fi ssioning at the appropriate moment,32 and in directing the fi ssion 
products to the appropriate space-time location for the appearance of 
the resurrection body. Given all this, however, the model still functions 
in the way proposed by Zimmerman.
Th e other diff erence from Zimmerman is of greater moment. Th ey 
disagree with Zimmerman’s inclusion in his model of a closest continuer 
theory of personal identity, and they disagree with his claim that any 
materialist view of persons can be forced into accepting such a theory. 
Th eir own proposal amounts to a way in which a materialist view can 
avoid a closest continuer theory, a diff erent way than the one I proposed 
above. In order to understand this, we need a brief summary of the 
ontology embraced by O’Connor and Jacobs. Th e ontology in question 
is described by them as an “ontology of immanent universals.” Each and 
every substance (for instance, an electron which they dub ‘eleanore’) 
involves features or universals that exist in that substance but can also 
exist in many others. But given this, 
there must be something more to eleanore than a mere cluster of universals, 
since it is a particular thing, and no cluster of universals can yield particularity. 
Th is something extra can only be eleanore’s particularity or thisness, a non-
qualitative aspect necessarily unique to it. Eleanore, then, is constituted by 
a cluster of universals, plus such a particularity, bound in some sort of non-
mereological structure, which we shall call a “state of aff airs.”33
Eleanore’s particularity or thisness, then, is an ontological constituent of 
eleanore though not, in the proper sense, a “part” of eleanore. It needs to 
be noted, however, that these thisnesses are more sparingly distributed 
in the world than one might be inclined to think. Th ey write,
Anyone who embraces this ontology in a serious way should posit distinctive 
particularities in only mereological simples and those composites that 
32 If not, then the particles must somehow be able to recognize, not only the moment 
of death, but the fact that the body they jointly constitute is that of a person, and thus 
eligible for immortal existence.
33 Timothy O’Connor and Jonathan D. Jacobs, “Emergent Individuals,” Th e Philo-
sophical Quarterly Vol. 53 No. 213 (2003), pp. 540-55; p. 546.
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exhibit some kind of objective, ontological unity. Substances exhibiting 
ontologically emergent properties are natural candidates. Th ose lacking such 
features, however much they may appear to be unifi ed to the uneducated 
eye, are individual objects only by a courtesy born of practical concerns.34
We arrive, then, at a metaphysic that exhibits some striking similarities 
to that expounded by Peter van Inwagen in his Material Beings.35 What 
exists are physical simples and some organisms; strictly speaking there 
are no chairs but only “simples arranged chair-wise.” 
Here is how this metaphysic addresses questions of personal identity: 
Each person, whether Augustine, Alphonse, or any one of us, has 
a particularity as a non-mereological constituent. Th is particularity 
is, indeed, what makes each of us a genuine individual, rather than 
a mere collection of components. And in cases that might otherwise 
seem ambiguous, it is the particularity that determines which of the 
two “candidates” continues the life of, and is indeed identical with, 
a previously existing individual. Th ey write,
Now, Zimmerman’s scenario: Take both of my hemispheres out of my body 
and put each into a separate body. Which one continues my life? Empirically, 
they are equally well-suited candidates. But on the soul view, Zimmerman 
claims, “. . . I went wherever my soul went – either with the one half-brain, 
or with the other, or with neither, as the case may be.”36 In other words, 
one hemisphere, at least, will generate a distinct mental substance, while 
another may continue to sub-serve the previously existing soul, or perhaps 
also give rise to a new one. Th ese possibilities will be empirically indistin-
guish able, while being plainly distinct metaphysically. Just so, we say, on 
our emergentist account: where the entire organism that I am fi ssions into 
two living organisms, I may be the one on the left , the one on the right, or 
neither. Th ere is a fact of the matter, even if it is hard to say what determines 
which fact it is. . . . Given a situation of perfect symmetry from an empirical/
observable point of view, the determining factor could only be a built-in 
‘bias’ (left , right, or neither) to the latent disposition towards fi ssioning.37
34 Ibid., p. 547.
35 Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.
36 “Falling Elevator Model,” p. 198.
37 “Emergent Individuals and the Resurrection,” p. 81.
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Symmetrical fi ssion, then, need not be the end of an individual’s life, on 
either view. And in the resurrection case, it is Carlos who is identical with 
Alphonse, without any need for recourse to a closest continuer view.
Now for our assessment of the O’Connor-Jacobs version of the Falling 
Elevator Model. Insofar as their version resembles Zimmerman’s, it 
inherits both its assets and its liabilities. Th eir version, like Zimmerman’s, 
must reject the demand for continuity of matter and the gradual 
assimilation of new matter, as captured in the assimilation principle 
(AP2’). It seems, on the other hand, that they have eliminated the other 
main group of objections, those associated with Zimmerman’s adoption 
in his model of a closest continuer theory of personal identity. To be 
sure, there is a cost involved in this: in order to accept their model, we 
must also accept as literally true the ontology they present, or one very 
much like it. Whether this is a serious problem is a question on which 
opinions will diff er, but it needs to be kept in mind.
Th ings are not, however, quite that simple. Zimmerman’s emergent 
soul is metaphy sically separable from any physical embodiment, so it 
provides a criterion for personal identity that is independent of bodily 
continuity. Th e O’Connor-Jacobs particularity, on the other hand, is the 
particularity of a living organic body, and as such it must go where the 
body goes. We’ve seen their suggestion that, in the case of symmetrical 
fi ssion, there might be a built-in bias that would determine that the 
particularity ends up in one or the other of the fi ssion products. But 
what shall we say in the resurrection case, where fi ssion is by no means 
symmetrical but where there are, nevertheless, serious questions about 
what has happened to the original body? If the particularity goes with 
the resulting body that is most similar to the body of the dying person, 
this view will inherit the diffi  culties of Zimmerman’s closest continuer 
view, as outlined above. I do not think it will be satisfactory to say that 
it is God who determines which body inherits the particularity: that is 
too close to saying that personal identity is determined by divine fi at, 
which is a view we should want to avoid. Probably we will have to invoke 
once again a built-in “bias” in the material constituents, but this time 
a bias towards a body in the resurrection world, whatever the other 
characteristics of such a body might be. It’s as though each particle in 
the universe has built into it a nisus or telos, such that, if an organism 
of which it is a constituent undergoes fi ssion, then the identity of the 
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organism will go with the “fi ssion product” in the resurrection world, 
however remote in time or space, whereas (as we have repeatedly been 
told) the identity of the particle remains behind in the ordinary world. 
Curiouser and curiouser . . . 
One fi nal thought: if O’Connor and Jacobs share Zimmerman’s 
tentative assumption that the body that goes to the next world takes its 
organs along with it, it will be true for them as it is for Zimmerman, 
that the body that remains behind aft er a person’s death is a mere 
replica, something which never lived in the world and never subserved 
the life-experiences of a human person. Th is has especially interesting 
implications in the case of organ transplants: an organ transplanted 
from the “body” of a deceased person is not a real human organ; it has 
never functioned as part of a human body. Such an organ performs an 
organic function for the very fi rst time aft er it has been transplanted into 
the body of a recipient. If by this time your skeptical instincts have not 
been triggered, I am afraid those instincts have suff ered serious atrophy! 
I am reminded in this connection of a remark made by Zimmerman 
when he presented an early version of the Falling Elevator Model: “I off er 
Peter this ‘just so story,’ to do with as he will, with my compliments. I’m 
glad I’m a dualist with less need of it.”38 So far, Peter van Inwagen has 
shown no inclination to take advantage of the assistance thus proff ered. 
I believe, however, than a great many dualists will join Zimmerman in 
a hearty sigh of relief that “we have no need of this hypothesis.”39
38 Comment on van Inwagen’s “Dualism and Materialism,” delivered at the University 
of Notre Dame, November 3 1994.
39 My thanks to Dean Zimmerman and Jonathan Jacobs for comments on this 
material.
